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Introduction
This paper explores one of Kant’s formulations that the world’s citizenship should be organised in 
a federated system of states, free to choose their own universal laws. Such a system assumes a 
universal peace, where there is no conflict of interests and a universal ‘good will’ that govern all  
members (Kant, 1795). Although Kant acknowledges that the citizens of autonomous states could 
choose an endless variety of laws and moral principles to govern their affairs, his metaphysical 
formulations confer the expectations that all governance systems should share a common universal 
Categorical Imperative (CI), or a set of moral principles that underlay the good will of all citizens 
and all states. Our discussion examines the possibility for such a universal system of governance 
and sources of variations in practice. 
In a global world order there is a plurality of forms of organisation of different socio-economic 
systems. These forms of organisation refer to different structures of government and different sets 
of relationships between economic actors. The plurality itself stems from different social histories 
and national  memories  (path  dependence),  from different  levels  of  industrialisation,  economic 
development, and liberalisation of the market forces (economic determinism), and from different 
political  systems  and  dominant  cultural  frameworks  and  political  ideologies  (political 
determinism). 
The proliferation of different socio-economic systems has always been part of the human history. 
However,  the  visibility  and  interpretations  of  these  variations  has  been  subject  to  political 
recognition  (particularly  by  dominant  powers  in  the  world),  and  theoretical  recognition  (by 
dominant paradigms in social sciences). The social and political sciences have failed so far to distil  
universal principles that establish the perfect moral order, according to Kant’s formulation.
The plurality in  governance  and public  administration  has  been established  empirically in  the 
literature.  There is  a vast  body of social  and political  theories that explain individual  systems. 
Comparisons  across  systems  are  rare,  and  most  of  the  established  fundamental  principles  of 
societal  organisation have been theoretically contested.  One of these systems based on market 
economy with political democracy has been referred to as the most suitable to facilitate economic 
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growth and wealth creation and to satisfy human needs, which in Kant’s view are all imperfect 
motivations – far away from any moral principles advocating universal good for all. Critics to this 
system have been silenced with the argument that even though the market democracy is imperfect, 
it is the best invented so-far to serve humanity. In addition, there has been a deep conceptual rift in  
the theories that examine different parts of the system. While the literature on the economic part of 
the  system  puts  emphasis  on  efficiency  and  growth  through  opportunity  maximisation,  the 
literature on the political part puts emphasis on the benefits of choice and majority rule, where 
none of these principles can be interpreted as a universal law for all in Kantian way. 
This paper discusses some of the current theories that underpin the analysis and interpretation of 
public administration practice, or public governance in different socio-economic systems. We look 
at some of the dominant postulates of regulation and governance, and question to what extent they 
can be accepted as universal principles. Different types of governance mechanisms are compared 
and contrasted in the context of strategic actors such as: the public government as a regulating 
authority, and the firms as regulated economic actors. We look at both – the regulator and the 
regulated – as strategic actors making strategic choices under the information asymmetries that 
they generate.  We look  also  at  theories  that  explain  the  impact  of  public  governance  on  the 
strategic behaviour of economic actors whose interests have been regulated. 
While the economists still argue around the a priory notion of government – i.e. what is the nature 
of government and whether it should get involved in regulating markets (Krugman, 2009), the 
government is actively involved in a decision-making capacity that affects markets. Even when the 
government  stands-back  and  let  liberalised  markets  to  determine  the  principles  of  economic 
transactions, the government is effectively governing these transactions by implementing policy 
choices.  The  rules  in  liberal  markets  are  still  legally  binding  and  determined  by  the  public 
authority. 
The argument in this paper is that governments as regulators of national socio-economic systems 
are strategic actors in their capacity to actively shape the regulatory environment, implementing 
various coordination mechanisms that facilitate the functioning of the economy and the society. 
Hence, there is a strong asymmetry between those making the law and those following it. From 
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that perspective, Kant’s requirement for universality of principles (Kant, 1785) can not be fulfilled 
and we can only compare imperfect systems based on imperfect moral principles. We are pursuing 
a theoretical synthesis across public administration and economic governance theory that explain 
the role of government in its regulatory function, the governance mechanisms that are selected and 
implemented by governments, and the impact of these regulatory activities on the strategic choices 
of all other economic actors. Much of this discussion is based on assessment of the positive and 
negative implications from asymmetric experiences between governors and governed, where we 
attempt to make some ethical judgements on market imperfections and government imperfections.
This theoretical discussion is pursued in two separate sections. The first section reviews leading 
regulation  theories  that  explain  how governments  in  their  decision-making capacity engage in 
regulation at macro-level of the entire socio-economic system. The second section follows from 
this  argument  and  discusses  the  governance  theory  and  alternative  governance  mechanisms 
designed  and  employed  by governments  to  manage  the  strategic  behaviour  of  the  individual 
economic actors at mezzo- and micro-level of contract relationships. The paper concludes with 
some  principles  for  comparative  analysis  of  different  public  administration  practices  across  a 
variety of socio-economic systems.
Public Administration Theory and the Regulatory Function of the State 
The regulation of a socio-economic system requires a legitimate government that has authority and 
powers,  as  well  as  the  capacity  and  capabilities,  to  generate  the  rules  that  govern  economic 
behaviour within the system of their jurisdiction. Unfortunately Kant does not address the case 
when the social order is based on inequality, where some individuals can express their free will in 
designing laws, while others don’t have this opportunity. Kant also does not provide guidance – 
how to treat representation of the free will of human agents in a political context.
Natural boundaries of regulation systems are the national boundaries of countries, protected by 
national  governments.  International  players,  such  as  global  corporations  and  multinational 
enterprises recognise when they hop-in and out of a system. In their operations, they adapt their 
strategies to different rules and practices, in different regulatory regimes, and build relationships 
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with different public authorities. Hence, we have a heterogeneous system of players among which 
are  national  law-makers,  national  law-followers,  international  law-followers,  and  unequal 
distribution of power among these agents. 
There  is  a  shared  view  among  many  theoretical  perspectives  that  public  administration  is 
simultaneously:  a)  governance  of  the  society  and  economy  within  national  boundaries;  b) 
management of the resource allocation process; and c) institutionalisation of justice in the public 
domain, where public administrators are seen as agents carrying out the public interest with their 
authority (Wamsley,  1990,  pp.  21-29).  The leading public  administration  theories  that  aim to 
explain the functioning of public organisations, and the relationships that emerge in relation to the 
definition  and fulfilment  of  public  interests,  are:  the  public  choice theory;  the  social  contract 
theory; and the principle-agent theory. These theories do represent the scientific knowledge of the 
regulation  and governance of  a  socio-economic  system.  The inability of  public  administration 
theory to derive at a unified set of universal principles represents the state-of-art in social theory in 
general, where there is a proliferation of theoretical frameworks. 
Kant  does  not  provide  much  guidance  towards  universal  principles  that  can  be  applied  to  a 
culturally embedded political relationships. His concept of the autonomous state derives from an 
individualistic  point  of view, where the state  is  constituted  of autonomous individuals  able to 
express  their  will.  His  concept  of  community  is  also  quite  simple,  referring  to  reciprocal 
interactions and forces, guiding the co-existence of things and human actors (Kant, 1785). Such a 
view does not allow for any interpretation of institutions and private interests that are pursuit with 
no harm to, or to the detriment of others. Most of Kant’s directions stem from his interpretations of 
reflexivity of human actors, or being able to understand and reason about causal relationships. It is 
very difficult to apply his moral principle of Categorical Imperative to the political domain, where 
the  free  will  of  human  beings  in  practice  is  expressed  through  individual  and  institutional 
representation.  All  public administration theories however, recognise that there is  a substantial 
difference  between  the  individual  choices  of  the  represented  (the  public),  and  those  of  the 
representing (or individuals engaged in politics and government).
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Public Choice Theory
The public choice theory infers that the public chooses the type of the system of governance and 
mode of regulation.  The theory advances the discussion on innovation support vs. bureaucratic 
authoritative allocation of resources, where it is assumed that bureaucratic government is based on 
hierarchy and command in regulation and decision making, while the innovation in government 
implies experimentation and the working of a ‘free market’ (Russell and Waste, 1998, McNutt 
(2002), Mueller (2003).
 
The choice, therefore, between a free market, and an administrative allocation of resources is a 
question of which means are more appropriate to certain chosen ends.  As the purpose is universal 
and not questioned, the choice of the means (or the selection of a model of public administration) 
is  justified  – either  with the efficiency argument  (i.e.  efficient  markets),  or with political  and 
ideological choices (i.e. socialist government and public ownership of the means of production).
Critics of this juxtaposition emphasise that “the purpose of public organisation is the reduction of 
economic, social, and psychic suffering”, and the enhancement of life opportunities for all societal 
members (LaPorte, 1971, p. 32). LaPorte’s definition suggests universality of the purpose, where 
the institutional forms of achieving this purpose, or the implementation of the laws of duty may 
vary.  This  contrast  is  made  with  the  assumption  that  both  a  bureaucratic  and  an  innovative 
government are specific means-to-an-end, where the purpose and the socio-political objectives set 
by government  have the transcendental power to frame all  relationships in the socio-economic 
system.
The socialist system is an example of a public choice of a form of administrative co-ordination of 
macro-economic activities and relationships, along with the corresponding costs and benefits to 
society (Kornaj,  1992).  Regulated  vs.  liberalised  market  economy is  also a  public  choice  that 
frames the role of government as a regulating authority. Both of these systems can be driven by a 
variety of  practical  objectives  and moral  principles,  and neither  of  them suggests  methods  of 
implementation of the public choice, or the type of institutions designed to exercise the decision-
making and resource allocation capacity of government. At the implementation level we can see 
that universal or moral principles break down even further to culturally and historically embedded 
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practices,  creating a  proliferation  of  institutional  adaptations  and governance mechanisms  that 
shape a specific national system of public administration (PA). Comparisons across national PA 
systems recognise that the political orientation of the government and the efficient coordination 
mechanisms employed by this government are distinctive but complementary choices.
Social Contract Theory and Kantian Ethics
The social contract theory reflects on the agreement between the public and the government as 
enacted through democratic elections. Government efficiency in fulfilment of the social contract is 
measured in terms of democratic accountability (Wilson, 1987). Transparency (or transcendental 
publicity - Kant, 1785) is proposed as the main guarantor for accountability, and the main solution 
to the problem of asymmetry of information between the governors and the governed.
Accountability  and  transparency  are  quite  instrumental  to  functioning  democracies.  These, 
however, remain imperfect means for control of the law-makers by the law-followers. Kant does 
not give much insight on the control process. His Categorical Imperative assumes that rational 
human beings would follow the universal principles of moral duty and good will as an end-in-
itself. Kant does not leave room for representation of the good will. There is a split agency into 
represented and representing, which raises the issues of transparency and accountability between 
the two.
The  social  contract  theorists  ignore  the  fact,  that  evaluation  of  both  policy  objectives,  and 
outcomes  is  conducted  mainly by the  elected  officials,  therefore  the  public  is  not  capable  to 
exercise an affective control over government regarding the extent of fulfilment of the contract. 
The fact that the public through general elections could change government, does not mean that the 
public could evaluate the true outcomes from the work of this government. The theory of social 
contract does not make clear who is the agency of real control over the policy process. Public 
administrators  never  receive  performance  measurement  (Selde,  et.al.,  1999),  and  their  true 
accountability resides within the government hierarchy, and not within the public election system. 
In addition, compliance with government rules and regulations is much wider observed behaviour, 
rather then effective public control over decision making and justification for government rules 
and regulations.
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An  uncontested  ground  for  the  social  contract  theory  is  the  notion  of  reason  and  power  in 
administrative  action.  It  is  the  organisation  theory,  which  looks  at  the  individual,  group,  and 
organisational motives for certain decisions, choices and action. The implementation of the social 
contract therefore is subject to the motivations and enactments by different social actors, including 
government officials. Such behaviourist treatment of the notion of government is complemented 
by the institutionalism, which focuses on the rules and other institutional constructs that produce 
social norms and subsequent behaviours (Russell and Waste, 1998). 
Institutions are necessary to change and maintain certain value preferences in a society. However, 
the  very preferences,  motivations  and commitments  are  very often a  subjective  outcome of  a 
cultural process of interpersonal interactions and a policy process of negotiations and bargaining, 
or what Kant refers to as imperfect reasons (1875). Neither behaviourism, nor institutionalism 
have developed definitions of preferences and choices that represent perfect intentions and good 
will. In fact, individual preferences and choices are defined as imperfect motivations in Kantian 
sense, or humans pursuing the satisfaction of their individual interests.
Humans are more motivated in environments where they have a greater choice but also a stronger 
control  (Katzell  and  Thompson,  1990;  Rainey,  1993).  This  empirical  observation  is  counter-
intuitive  to  the  social  contract  theory as  it  suggests  that  the  public  choice  of  government  is 
conditioned by the government control itself. 
Political  objectives, institutional constraints, and individual motivations seem to be intertwined 
into a tight node that drives the continuous policy process in a socio-economic system. In this 
context, the social contract between the government and the public implicitly requires the support 
of an appropriate institutional framework, political leadership, and widely spread legitimacy of the 
administrative agencies.  Issues of corruption of government  and weak government  are seen as 
deviations from the system, rather then as intrinsic systemic features that reflect the co-evolution 
of the economy and society.
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Every mission-driven  government  is  established  under  a  political  leadership  by a  Party,  and 
implies  a  top-down goal  orientation  and some form of  planning and budgetary control  of  the 
resource allocation  within the socio-economic system,  where the implementation  of the policy 
objectives is based on strict budget control over public finances. The efficiency of government is 
measured by the extent of achievement of the policy objectives, compared to the costs of policy 
implementation (including monitoring and control) – whether it is related to market regulation, or 
to direct intervention in the economy. This evaluation does not consider the moral grounds for 
these policy objectives. The implementation of political objectives involves not only allocation of 
resources,  but  building  coalitions  of  agencies  that  bargain  and  negotiate  between  themselves 
certain outcomes. The political authority that shapes the regulatory environment, that subsequently 
affects individual and organisational behaviour, is the leading agency of change and reform in a 
society. 
Social  contracts,  hence,  are  intermediated  by a  rich  institutional  canvas  of  political  and other 
special  interests  groups,  as  well  as  monitoring  and  enforcement  agencies.  The  socio-cultural 
environment  simultaneously imposes frames of reference on all  actors – the regulated and the 
regulators.  The  most  universal  principle  that  we  can  distil  from  this  discussion,  is  that  the 
regulation and governance of a socio-economic system is intermediated by institutions  and the 
relationships  between  the  government  and  the  governed  are  subject  to  multiple  subjective 
interpretations. Each actor in Kantian way makes unique judgements of the rules, agreements, and 
obligations to comply with these rules. Each human agent derives at his/her formulation of their 
duties based on these subjective interpretations. Ultimately, Kantian universal good will is enacted 
through  imperfect  motivations,  shaped  by  imperfect  institutions  and  negotiated  contract 
agreements.  Neither  Kant’s  Categorical  Imperative,  not  Social  Contract  theory  can  provide 
guidance for the role of institutions such as religious and political organisations, on shaping the 
subjective perception of duty and moral law.
 
Principle-agent theory is an extension to the behaviourism in public administration and advocates 
that the government is composed of elected officials as ‘principles’, and appointed administrators 
as ‘agents’. Issues of accountability,  communications and interactions between ‘principles’ and 
‘agents’,  as  well  as  the  role  of  political  incentives  and  information  asymmetries  in  decision 
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making, are discussed within this theoretical perspective. Researchers are convinced that the policy 
choices of the ‘principles’ are ‘framed’ by the information provided by appointed and entrusted 
administrators  (acting as agents),  alongside with the bureaucratic  discretion of the latter  (Hill, 
1985; Bendor, 1990; Selden, et. al., 1999). Authors conclude that change of policy direction by the 
‘principles’  is  constrained  by  the  monitoring  and  control  costs,  associated  with  a  particular 
structure of principle-agent relationships. The real representation of public interests appears to be 
driven  by  the  bureaucratic  ‘agents’,  rather  than  the  democratically  elected  ‘principles’  in 
government. 
In  this  context,  government  failure  could  result  either  from  systemic  features  that  restrict 
accountability and transparency in the principle-agent relationship,  or from some practices that 
have emerged at the implementation stage, and the interactions between elected and appointed 
government officials.  Systemic failure, hence, can be attributed to either the political choice, or 
the administrative  implementation  of this  choice,  or  to  the cultural  canvas of  practices,  moral 
judgements, and individual or institutional interactions.
Kantian Dialectic
Overall, the public administration theory distils some principles that stem from the heterogeneity 
of socio-economic actors. The distinction between ‘principles and agents’, and between ‘governors 
and governed’ opens a wide schism of rights, influence, and domination, where the conflict of 
interests  frames  an  endless  contest  between  different  groups  of  actors.  Although  Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative and the notion of moral law should apply to all human agents in a society, 
the heterogeneity of agents creates enclaves of special interests, attitudes, and groups of people that 
interpret differently the notion of duty.  
The public administration theory is an eclectic theoretical field that has addressed a number of 
theoretical and empirical questions, related to the role of government in different socio-economic 
systems, the role of institutions and different regulatory activities in the administrative process, the 
variation  in  methods  for  manipulation  and control  of  public  opinion,  decision  making,  or  the 
political process itself. The issues of legitimacy and decline of authority, the nature of reforms led 
by government, and reforms in government, the costs and the benefits of the public administration 
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to the society as a whole, and the impact of government regulatory activities on the economic 
behaviour of the governed, are in the focus of theoretical and empirical investigations.
Some  of  the  empirical  questions  in  public  administration  theory are  related  to  difficulties  in 
identifying  clearly  the  leading  institutions  that  represent  the  foundations  of  government,  the 
agencies engaged in decision making and resource allocation within given institutional framework, 
and other stakeholders in a society that  are affected by distributive  decisions.   There are also 
normative questions, related to the proper definition of the public interest, and the role prescribed 
to and played by the public agencies. Both types of questions are important in order to analyse the 
working of a social system. While the normative questions are related to political  choices, the 
empirical questions derive from the implementation process, and focus on the actual working of 
government.
All  questions  regarding  decision  making  in  public  administration  have  both  empirical  and 
normative aspect. There is uncritical acceptance of decisions as morally neutral and empirically 
self-evident.  Organizational  analysis  employs  the essentially technicist  idea of  decisions  being 
totally  divorced  from  the  moral  questions  of  the  good.  Decision-based  analysis  is  usually 
trivialized, and questions of power and influence are neglected altogether (Harmon, 1998). This 
applies not only to generalised political decisions regarding the establishment of fundamental co-
ordination mechanisms, but to specific administrative decisions on allocation of resources. Moral 
and  ethical  considerations  on  the  distribution  of  outcomes  to  society  are  substituted  with 
arguments  for cost-efficiency. Rational decisions are, in this  sense calculative decisions,  rather 
then justified with Kant’s Categorical Imperative for good will, or universal law that protect and 
represent the interest of all human actors (Kant, 1785).
In  addition,  administrative  decisions  involve  substantial  negotiations  and  a  subsequent 
administrative control, and hence are in the realm of praxis, rather then in the realm of a priory 
knowledge. Kant does not give us much guidance on the translation of a priory knowledge to 
practice. He acknowledges that this takes place through the acting and choices of human agents, 
but  the  analysis  remains  individualistic  and  difficult  to  translate  to  social  interactions  in 
communities, where the ethical questions are more acute. 
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Decisions by the public administrators can not be divorced from the process of decision-making, 
where interests are recognised, motives are enacted, and outcomes are negotiated. We can put a 
clear distinction between those that make the decisions (law-makers), and those that are subjected 
to the redistributive impact from these decisions (law-followers). Kant assumes that both can be 
guided by the Categorical  Imperative of  a universal  good will.  This,  however,  is  not  possible 
because decisions involve distribution of resources, which are material in nature and are unequally 
distributed  in  a society.  Distribution  of  resources  in  heterogeneous systems of  unequal  human 
agents can not be universal and is determined by a political process that involves  judgements on 
human needs and intellectual capabilities, assessment of value, and using preferences to overcome 
resource  constraints.  By  their  nature,  decisions  include  negotiations  and  contestability.  The 
legitimacy of  the  decision-making authority and the  administrative  capabilities  of  government 
officials to enact decisions are of critical importance. 
The  re-distributive  power  of  decisions  particularly in  the  context  of  limited  resources,  create 
inequalities,  which  become  self-reinforced  by  the  unequal  access  to  these  resources.  The 
inequalities induce domination where Kant’s universal principles can not be applied. Weber (1978) 
describes domination as the probability that certain specific commands will be obeyed by a given 
group of persons. Domination may be exercised at both stages of decision-making and decision 
implementation, or throughout the entire political process. Such domination requires moral and 
ethical solutions that differ from Kant’s Categorical Imperative and have been explored at length 
in various political theories (the discussion of which goes beyond the scope of this work).
Another string of research in public administration research is lead by the historical question of the 
rise and decline of civilisations and the associated crisis in government. Daley’s research (1998) 
revealed  that  the  declines  and  revivals  of  the  Roman  Empire  could  be  explained  by  the 
organizational legitimacy of the leading institutions, the ability of government to resist corruption, 
the organizational abilities to implement political decisions; and finally effective leadership of the 
policy process. Not one of these characteristics of government is associated with any moral or 
ethical criteria or universal principles. Only the ability of government to resist corruption can be 
interpreted as a high order Categorical Imperative, shaping the behaviour of government officials. 
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Legitimacy and leadership are means-to-an end, and do not relate to any particular notion of duty 
and moral choices. The utilitarian approach in social sciences has shifted attention away from the 
ethics of human action,  and has substituted moral  questions with emphasise on efficiency and 
legitimacy.  Both  principles  of  efficiency  and  legitimacy  represent  a  posteriory  judgement, 
grounded in human experience and history. They are hence, principles that are politically justified 
by dominant political actors, and imperfect for a universal translation. 
All four factors highlighted in Daley’s research can be considered as essential means for effective 
regulatory activity by government. Governance and regulation of a socio-economic system require 
legitimacy,  political  leadership,  organisational  capacity and self-constraint  from corruption and 
opportunism. The government  as a regulator acts  in a strategic way, through political  choices, 
through design and implementation  of  policies,  and through decisions  that  affect  the  strategic 
choices of the rest of the human actors in the system.
Administrative reforms, market oriented or otherwise, are not neutral. Changing the rules of the 
game by governments  changes  the  probable  winners  and losers  in  political  contests,  and pre-
determines who would be disenfranchised in this process (Knott and Miller, 1987; Russell and 
Waste, 1998). Governments are the managers of a reform process, and their political choices pre-
select the outcomes from this reform process. Both the decisions and their implementation and 
negotiation are politically biased, and therefore not rational in Kantian way. Many social equity 
outcomes involve the distribution of benefits to those with few assets. Re-distributive decisions are 
often contested and require negotiation with some social groups. This process takes place in both 
market and centrally planned economies.
The public administration theory has acknowledged that the authoritative allocation of resources is 
central to human society (Russell and Waste, 1998). The costs of the public administration process 
however,  can  vary according  to  different  implementation  regimes,  where  different  regulatory 
mechanisms and governance forms are adopted. Administrative costs can accumulate from: the 
efforts  to  negotiate  and  take  political  decisions;  the  monitoring  and  control  of  policy 
implementation; the costs of termination of policies, the costs of institution building and support,  
and  the  general  costs  of  administration  and  management  (Frantz,  1997,  Greenwood,  1997). 
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Rational agents in this context are those that can calculate and can minimise these costs – motives 
that carry no ethical value. Social systems utilise different co-ordination mechanisms in order to 
govern and regulate the allocation of resources. The theoretical discussion of these coordination 
mechanisms has taken place within the governance theory, and in particular, the economics debate 
on corporate governance and control, which will be discussed in the subsequent section of this 
paper.
Governance and Co-ordination Mechanisms
Overall public administration theory consists of postulates on the role and nature of government, 
and the variations in governance across different socio-economic systems. So how do governments 
govern socio-economic systems? What are the specific governing tools, and what is known in the 
literature as coordination and control mechanisms used by governments for managing economic 
transactions and socio-political interactions in different country contexts?
While regulation implies intervention activities at system level, governance, implies intervention at 
the  level  of  individual  economic  actors.  Governance  involves  design  and  implementation  of 
incentives  and  constraints  in  order  to  manage  the  motives  and  strategic  behaviour  of  actors. 
Economic  governance  is  a  system/mechanism  for  allocation  of  resources,  control  and  co-
ordination of economic activities at firm level that facilitates strategic direction, accountability, 
transparency and  wealth  creation  (Todeva,  2005).  Corporate  governance  is  also  known as  an 
effective mechanism for allocation of resources in the economy and for creating value-added. The 
effectiveness of corporate governance depends on solving the agency problem of the separation of 
ownership from control and depends on clear allocation of ownership rights to some individuals, 
clear rules establishing rights and responsibilities, and compliance with these rules. It is not the 
autonomous will of human actors to follow these rules, but a requirement by law for compliance 
with these rules. 
The universality of law is an attempt to bridge the gap between the governors and the governed. 
However, the two remain distinctively different. While the governors can express their free choice 
in Kantian way, the governed do not have this alternative, and hence their participation in self-
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coordination following some moral principles is constrained. Their action is driven by their will in 
compliance  with  rules  designed  by  others  and  serving  others’  interests.  Kant’s  free  will  is 
constraint by the fact that governance rules are not universal as they serve specific interests of a 
selected group of people in a society.
In  order  to  untangle  these  tensions  we  will  start  with  a  general  definition  of  co-ordination.  
According  to  Frances  et.al.  (1991)  co-ordination  implies  the  bringing  into  a  relationship  of 
otherwise disparate activities or events. Co-ordination therefore aims at making compatible the 
efforts of actors that are involved in co-operative or non-co-operative economic activities. Leading 
questions are who decides on the rules and regulations that establish the co-ordination mechanism, 
how this  mechanism is  implemented  in  a  society,  what range  of  activities are  externally  co-
ordinated, and which activities are left under self-co-ordination? Here we would like to distinguish 
between external co-ordination, which implies agency, power, and politics, vs. self-co-ordination, 
which is an expression of the free choices of economic actors, and is interpreted as a spontaneously 
emergent agreements, rules and principles that facilitate impartial economic transactions between 
autonomous and free economic actors. In self-coordination economic actors enact self-constraints 
based on their relationships, values, and mutual agreements. The two forms of external governance 
and internal self-coordination may be congruent within a socio-economic system when one is an 
extension of the other.
Overall, there are three possible scenarios of coordination mechanisms in the literature - markets, 
hierarchies, and networks, or any combination between them (Levacic, 1991, Todeva. 1998). The 
design of these mechanisms is not the ultimate end of the policy and governance process as each of 
these mechanisms is a ‘means-to-an-end’, where the end is not specified.  Each mechanism implies 
a different logic of co-ordination and leads to a variety of outcomes and costs. Each mechanism 
can be implemented by variety of rules and practices, which can lead to different sets of constraints 
on different groups of actors, and hence, limiting their options for free choices. Each mechanism is 
also interpreted through a different range of theoretical perspectives or theoretical lenses which 
constrain their comparative evaluation. Comparative research has suggested various typologies and 
extensions of coordination mechanisms (Todeva, 1998). 
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In Coase’s framework, firms (or hierarchies) and markets are considered as alternative means for 
organising similar kinds of transactions (Coase, 1937). While  Williamson (1981) discusses the 
dichotomy between markets  and hierarchies,  Ouchi  (1991) talks  about  the complementarity of 
markets,  hierarchies and clans (or  social  networks).  Kornai  (1992) suggests  five co-ordination 
mechanisms:  1) bureaucratic co-ordination,  2) co-ordination through markets,  3) self-governing 
co-ordination,  4)  ethical  co-ordination,  and  5)  family  co-ordination.  As  an  extension  to  this 
typology, Todeva (1998) discusses political co-ordination as a form that is typical for the socialist 
system  of  central  planning.  Ethical  and  family  coordination  are  also  interpreted  as  forms  of 
network coordination.  The subsequent sections of this  paper discuss in turn these coordination 
mechanisms and their impact on the strategic behaviour and choices of economic actors. 
Markets, hierarchies and networks remain at the heart  of all coordination mechanisms, as they 
represent fundamentally different types of transactions and interactions. The concept of ‘market’ in 
general terms is defined as a co-ordination device that involves a voluntary exchange of goods and 
services between two parties  at  a  known price (Levacic,  1991).  Pro-marketers  usually make a 
number of assumptions: regarding the existence of a homogeneous pools of buyers and suppliers, 
the transparency of information across the entire market space, the rational decision making on 
pricing  and  purchasing,  the  fairness  and  reciprocity in  transactions,  or  the  safeguards  against 
opportunistic behaviour. 
The functioning of the market requires by its very nature some form of regulation or organisation 
(i.e.  hierarchy) at  least  to  establish the minimum rules of self-regulation,  and mechanisms for 
feedback  and  control.  In  global  markets  such  as  the  financial  sector,  it  is  now  empirically 
acknowledged that  some form of  regulation  and oversight  is  essential  to  provide  checks  and 
safeguards for the system. Such regulation implies not only government and hierarchy, but also 
rules that affect the level of inequality between actors in a socio-economic system.
Pro-marketeers accept that markets are imperfect tools that require normative control by the state 
and a  wider  acknowledgement  of  the  social  embeddedness  of  economic  value  in  the  form of 
knowledge, social structures, dominance, politics, relationships, shared values, and other cultural 
factors  (Todeva,  1998).  However,  the  theoretical  discussion  of  the  economists  stops  short  of 
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recognition  that  behind  demand  stand  social  needs  and  social  interpretations  of  these  needs. 
Behind transactions stand social exchanges and relationships. The social canvas that embed market 
interactions is not universal, but vary for different actors and groups, and hence, the rules that 
govern socially embedded transactions can not be established as universal principles as always 
they will protect certain interests against others.
It  is  commonly recognised  that  markets  on  their  own are not  enough to  provide  for  efficient 
transactions. When the transaction involves qualities that are not easily measurable, or when the 
exchanges  involve  long-term relationships  and  a  vast  complexity  of  goods,  or  uncertainty of 
payments,  and  markets  fail  to  facilitate  efficient  transactions,  other  mechanisms  such  as 
hierarchies, alliance agreements, and strategic planning are put in operation
It is also important to stress that fast internationalisation of business activities and the globalisation 
of markets inevitably bring complexity of operations that bridge across extended inequalities. The 
examples of the complex global supplier networks in the telecommunications, the electronics, or 
the car manufacturing industry, and the lack of clear measurement of return on investment in R&D 
in these industries, demonstrate that the positioning of businesses is driven much more by strategic 
intent and vision, rather than by performance outcomes and market incentives.
 Most of the critical  commentary here on the market coordination mechanism is based on the 
theoretical assumptions about market efficiencies. Such efficiencies in practice are realised by the 
complementarities between the market incentives and the regulatory administration that establishes 
the principles and rules governing economic behaviour, known as hierarchy.  
The belief that markets and hierarchies are incompatible alternatives, is vigorously argued since 
Hayek (1944) who states that “both competition and central direction become poor and inefficient 
tools if they are incomplete, and a mixture of the two mechanisms means that neither will really 
work” (p. 31). The problem here is that no distinction is made between hierarchy and planning. 
While planning does ignore the question of agreements between economic agents on the objectives 
(Hayek, 1944), hierarchy or organisation is built  upon agreements and contracts with specified 
roles and responsibilities. Mutual agreements and contracts do represent independent individual 
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choices, which are the closest we could come the Kantian notion of a free will. It is argued that 
markets offer more choices to individuals  to express their  free will  when there are no market 
imperfections.
The concepts of hierarchy and organisation exhibit  the rationality in  organisations through the 
establishment of formal rules, task specialisation, and coordination of activities. It is still believed 
that organisation represents the most efficient mechanism for coordination of activities of large 
groups of people who may have a variety of interests and preferences. Organisational hierarchy can 
be used effectively both as intra- and inter-firm mechanisms of structuring collective action.
If we look at the types of hierarchies (Todeva, 1998), they could be interpreted at the level of the 
firm, the level of an industry, or the level of the national and the global economy. Each micro, 
mezzo, and macro level refers to an internal organisational structure that can employ different 
types of relationships. At the micro-level, the intra-firm structure of authority and responsibilities 
can resemble an internal market (Mintzberg, 1983) for social and political transactions. Intra- and 
inter-industry production chains at a mezzo-level represent another organisational formation that is 
constituted  by a  number  of  inter-connected  organisations  and interconnected input  and output 
markets. Market transactions at a macro-level require both individual firms to extend their internal 
administration,  and  the  growth  of  external  administration  for  contract  enforcement  by public 
institutions. 
Hierarchy and organisation are the main instruments for states to exercise their regulatory function. 
A common practice in the literature on governance is the use of hierarchy and bureaucracy as 
overlapping terms to represent the public administration authority. The substitution of the notion 
of government co-ordination with bureaucratic co-ordination is also common. As a result of that, 
the dichotomy between government and market is replaced by the dichotomy of bureaucracy and 
market. The term bureaucracy usually is used in a sense of inefficient administration, rather than as 
a principle  of rule-making and structuration of responsibilities,  functions,  power and authority. 
Both  markets  and  governments  can  be  inefficient.  However,  the  substitution  of  the  term 
government  with  hierarchy and  bureaucracy induces  assumptions  of  inherited  inefficiency.  In 
addition, planning can take place both in public organisations and in market institutions, as well as 
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both from top-down and from bottom-up, which can involve substantial negotiations and complex 
contract arrangements between independent agents. 
As  Beetham  (1987)  states,  in  modern  economies,  due  to  the  volume  and  complexity  of 
transactions, the market has to be supplemented by two forms of hierarchy: one that is constituted 
within the market (the firms), and the other outside it (the government). The spontaneous division 
of labour at micro-, mezzo-, and macro-level induces co-ordination externally by the market, or 
internally by purposefully arranged specialisation and co-ordination of the division of labour by 
administrative means’ (Beetham, 1987).
Hierarchy at  a  micro-level  (within  firms)  is  explained  by Williamson  (1985)  as  ‘gains  from 
allowing  people  to  specialise  according  to  their  comparative  advantage,  or  economising  on 
resources. But the very existence of a specialisation induces inequality in the distribution of power 
and influence, and therefore raises the costs of internal negotiations and bargaining over allocative 
decisions.  Specialisation  within  firms  also  is  seen  to  create  monopoly over  certain  decisions 
(McGuinness,  1991).  Specialisation  and  division  of  labour  induces  structural  inequalities  that 
constrain the free choices of actors and generate structural privileges to some at the expense of 
others.
It is important to note that both market failure and government failure are associated with their 
deficiency to co-ordinate highly complex economic transactions. Both co-ordination mechanisms 
cannot  prevent concentrations  of power by a limited number of actors,  and both can generate 
inequalities and structural rigidities.
 In Todeva (1998) we argued for the complementarity of markets and hierarchies as coordination 
mechanisms,  recognising  that  both  represent  imperfect  tools  for  allocation  of  resources  and 
regulation of economic activities. Both generate inequalities which create political tensions and 
have  unaddressed  ethical  consequences.  Network  coordination  is  proposed  to  address  these 
deficiencies  and  to  create  an  environment  where  autonomous  actors  make  choices,  build 
relationships, and sign agreements that create rules for the coordination of collective action.
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Markets  and  hierarchies  as  coordination  mechanisms  are  associated  with  the  mainstream 
(corporate) governance theory that looks at the distribution of ownership rights between the public 
and the private sector, and at the consequences from the separation of ownership and control, or 
the  distribution  of  coordination  and  control  across  multiple  agents.  Networks  represent  these 
messy arrangements where there are no clear ownership boundaries and the control is distributed 
across multiple actors.
Relational (or network) governance as a concept is discussed in a field that aims to disentangle the 
horizontal and vertical relationships that emerge in the process of coordination of decision making 
and resource flows in complex socio-economic systems. The network coordination mechanism is 
implemented  to  establish  some common rules  and practices  of  decision-making,  and resource 
allocation  in  the  context  of  distributed  control  rights  and  responsibilities  and  among  loosely 
connected agents. Network coordination emerges when interconnected actors start to coordinate 
present undertakings, and establish agreements for future activities.  
Governance  mechanisms  that  are  based  on  interactions  and  relationships  are  also  known  as 
‘collaborative  governance’.  Collaborative  governance  demonstrates  an  alternative  way for  re-
alignment  of  interests  of  all  economic  actors.  Collaborative  governance facilitates  information 
sharing, learning and innovation that ultimately brings comparative advantage to firms. Examples 
of  collaborative  governance  are  the  Japanese  corporate  groups  ‘keiretsu’  and  ‘sogo-shosha’ 
(Todeva,  2006),  various  conglomerates  and  multinational  corporations,  or  other  smaller  scale 
community and family businesses based on shared decision making. The main advantages of these 
formations  are:  their  flexibility,  adaptability,  facilitated  information  and  knowledge  exchange, 
access  to  a  range  of  alternative  sources  of  financial  assistance,  and  collaborative  attitude  to 
problem solving. 
Networks  are  seen  as  clusters  of  large  firms  charging  each  other  mutually  beneficial  prices 
(Todeva, 2005), while collectively extracting other market benefits through a collective action for 
maximising the joint welfare of all member firms (Lincoln et al., 1996). Overall, the literature on 
network coordination promotes the idea of superiority of relational alignment of interests against 
the ideas of adversarial market coordination, or the political bureaucratic coordination (Todeva, 
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1998). In this literature there is some discussion on corporate networks, family and community 
networks and the specific mechanisms used for their coordination and control. The discussion on 
family business networks is primarily in the context of Chinese business networks, quanxi, and kin 
relationships that translate into economic activities with shared assets, liabilities, profits and rents. 
Under this  umbrella  can be qualified various donor /  recipient  relationships,  mutual  assistance 
practices, voluntary work for the community, friends helping to substitute for market exchanges 
and services, or other family support activities ranging from house-keeping to business assistance. 
Employing relatives or friends is still a practice in situations that require trust, loyalty, or some 
extraordinary  efforts.  Research  on  the  effectiveness  of  such  methods  is  still  lacking  in  the 
literature.
Conclusions
None of the mechanisms discussed in this paper in the previous section, however, can establish 
claims for universality or fairness, to satisfy Kant’s requirements for a Categorical Imperative that 
establishes a universal moral order. The regulation of choices by strategic actors bares the inherited 
heterogeneity of their interests, intent and will. Kant’s Federated World Order has to be constituted 
from  self-interested  rational  and  calculative  actors  and  regulated  inequalities,  rather  then  by 
universal laws and independent actors bounded by their intrinsically good will and moral choices 
(Kant, 1788).
Most of the regulation and governance theorising has been informed by political ideologies and / 
or  empirical  observations.  It  remains  in  the  domain  of  our  contested  practical  knowledge  of 
political  systems and government  interventions  in the society.  Both governance and regulation 
theories  still  do  not  offer  a  wider  platform  for  comparisons  across  different  socio-economic 
systems. Political economists or public administration theorists have developed various positivist 
arguments that exploit concepts such as: efficiency, interests, and mechanisms of control – applied 
to  the  regulation  of  national  systems and the  governance  of  economic  activities  within  them. 
Definitions  of  these  concepts  vary,  and  they  are  employed  at  different  level  of  abstraction. 
Although there are some theories that have attracted more attention then others, none of them offer 
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a set  of  universal  principles  for  comparative  analysis,  or  as  a  humanistic  platform for  ethical 
governance and in a Federated World Order..
Each  socio-economic  system,  such  as  capitalist,  socialist,  or  a  developing  economy,  is 
conceptualised using different frame of reference. For the analysis of the capitalist  system, the 
focus  is  put  on  incentives,  constraints,  and  efficient  market  forces.  The  socialist  system  is 
discussed in terms of effectiveness of government intervention in the allocation of resources for 
public good. A developing economy usually is discussed in terms of the strengths / weaknesses of 
the institutional environment and the relationships between the public and the private sector and 
how both contribute to economic growth and wealth creation. Global comparisons reveal that any 
socio-economic system has aspects  of active market  forces,  government  interventions,  specific 
institutional environment, and a particular dynamics between the public and the private sector.  In 
a globalised world it is essential to establish some practical definitions that can allow comparisons 
across all these areas, and their multi-level interactions.
We  have  attempted  to  synthesise  across  multiple  theoretical  arguments  offering  a  view  that 
complex  socio-economic  systems  require  complex  instruments  of  government,  and  that  the 
effectiveness of government should be judged by the final outcomes from the regulatory activities 
by  the  state,  including  living  standards,  economic  development,  and  wealth  creation  and 
distribution  of  socio-economic  benefits.  Different  situations  of  economic  development  require 
different  government  policies  and  the  implementation  of  different  coordination  and  control 
mechanisms. There are no universal principles of regulatory practice. In a global world order it is 
expected that there will be a proliferation of different administrative practices at macro and micro 
level.
At micro-level our argument in this paper is that for firms to operate in a market environment, 
appropriate  hierarchical  co-ordination  is  required  in  order  to  provide  information  and 
communication infrastructure, which then becomes endogenous to firm’s decision making. A form 
of  organisation  is  an  essential  element  of  any coordination  mechanism  that  affects  strategic 
behaviour  with  implications  for  wealth  creation.  Any  organisational  arrangements,  however, 
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constrain the individual autonomy, which is essential to Kant’s transcendental idealism  (Alison, 
1986).
In this  paper we have argued that rational economic actors are combining in practice different 
coordination mechanisms and different principles that govern their interactions, exchanges, and 
participation  in  the  socio-political  process.  The  inefficiency  of  organisational  structures  are 
preferred by the firm’s decision makers in the cases of relatively greater costs of open market 
transactions,  or  in  the  cases  of  high  risks  and uncertainty,  environmental  threats,  and 
unpredictability of  the  outcomes.  This  view is  very well  pictured  by Richardson  (1972)  who 
describes firms as ‘islands of planned co-ordination in a sea of market relations’. In addition, both 
cases  of  internalisation  or  externalisation  of  activities  require  some  form of  coordination  and 
control, or a form of governance and administration – either at a micro level, or at a macro-level.
Government  intervention  at  a  macro  level  is  a  feature  of  any market  economy.  The  proper 
functioning of the market, according to Harvey (1996), is a result of a systematic political process 
that involves government intervention through taxation, subsidies, international relations between 
government, or regulations in the context of a complex and contested international arena. 
The classical price mechanism of efficient markets is ‘tuned’ by governments. Even in liberalised 
economies,  where  prices  are  determined  by  the  firms  themselves,  and  reflect  real  demand, 
government  taxation  or  inter-firm relationships  with  buyers  and suppliers,  play a  critical  role. 
Privileged information on potential  demand,  or powerful lobbying of governments  for specific 
taxation policies,  could make a significant impact on prices. The price mechanism in distorted 
markets is far from an efficient signal between actors, and is totally inadequate to improve the 
market relationships. If the market relationships break down, they can’t get fixed by themselves.
All transactions that take place in a market are governed by a set of contractual relations. The 
political  nature  of  these  contracts  is  demonstrated  by  the  exchange  of  information  and  the 
bargaining  and  negotiations  between  agents.  The  contracts  usually  are  driven  by  conflicting 
objectives of different partners. These ‘conflicts’  are reconciled by the ultimate sharing of the 
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benefits from the transaction. Negotiations give little scope for autonomous actors, as they require 
compromise with the individual interpretation of what is fair and intrinsically good.
The role of government has to be brought to the centre of debates on ethical regulation of efficient 
markets,  and on coordination  and governance  of  economic  activities  based  on morally sound 
principles.  The  Chinese  Government,  for  example,  identifies  five  leading  roles  for  itself:  1. 
promoter of growth, 2. manager of the economy, 3. distributor of income, 4. regulator of industry, 
and 5. protector of citizen and business (Liou, 1998). This by no means contradicts the present role 
of government in a market economy. The differences are mainly in the means used by government 
to  perform these roles.  Such a  pragmatic  vision  of  government  and markets  requires  a  set  of 
pragmatic rules, negotiated across the spectrum of very different socio-political systems and actors. 
Kant’s transcendental vision of a Categorical Imperative according to which actors unconditionally 
accept a synthetic apriory proposition as a universal principle to guide their behaviour is difficult 
to materialise in a socio-political context. Recent events related to the Copenhagen agreement on 
climate change demonstrate that even when there is a common vision on morally sound objectives, 
there are fundamental differences on how to pursue them, constraining actors. Constrained actors 
are not capable to make free choices and hence a Federated World Order has to accommodate 
practical reasoning in a world of inequalities. 
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